Suchergebnisse

Los nuevos enfoques institucionalistas han penetrado con fuerza en las distintas ciencias sociales en tiempos recientes. Estos enfoques han abordado el estudio del marco institucional del federalismo sobre nuevas bases teóricas. Esta nota se inicia fundamentando las bases de una segunda generación de teorías económicas del federalismo, que señalan el papel central de las instituciones en la agenda de investigación de los federalismos, y analiza la relevancia que en los enfoques institucionalistas tienen las perspectivas dinámicas sobre el cambio institucional. Estos apuntes teóricos abren una agenda de investigación que establece puentes entre el programa de análisis institucional del federalismo y el programa del cambio institucional.

Las reglas que organizan la estructura del legislativo afectan al comportamiento de sus miembros, la elección pública y los fundamentos políticos de una economía. El estudio de los mercados legislativos ha sido una constante en la investigación en economía política a lo largo de los decenios recientes. Este artículo analiza la organización industrial del Congreso de Diputados en España desde un enfoque propio de la nueva economía institucional. De este modo, se realiza un análisis de economía política madisoniana que estudia el papel de los derechos de propiedad, las jerarquías, los diputados individuales, los grupos parlamentarios, las transacciones y las comisiones en el Congreso español. En particular, este análisis, heredero de la tradición coaseana de "abrir la caja negra" de las organizaciones, evidencia las grandes caracteristicas que diferencian al sistema español del existente en el Congreso de Estados Unidos, el cual aparece en la bibliografía especializada como prototipo de Congreso de Comisiones.

World economy is living a time of change, and the complexity of change has implied a new research agenda on the role of economic policy in society. The role, types and effects of economic policy have been major issues in economic science since its origins. Jean Tinbergen (1956) [1] established the basis for the traditional theory of economic policy in economics and he tried to show how economic knowledge could be organized to regulate and guide economic systems. Nevertheless, this traditional approach has been improved through several contributions, for example when Eggertsson (1997) [2] incorporated the existence of incomplete knowledge, endogenous politics and institutional change in the theory of economic policy.

La nueva economía institucional ha incorporado las organizaciones a la agenda de investigación de la ciencia económica sobre bases teóricas renovadas, en las cuales el Estado aparece como elemento clave. Este artículo intenta abrir la caja negra del Estado español al estudiar elementos como el establecimiento del parlamentarismo y la relación entre el sistema político y los derechos de propiedad. Asimismo, indaga cómo el sistema español resuelve los trade-offs entre resoluteness-decisiveness y public-private regardedness en la formación de las políticas públicas, y analiza la relación de agencia vertical mediante la cual se forma la política económica. La estructura organizativa del Estado establece, así, un marco institucional que sesga la formación de las políticas públicas.

This book presents a set of original and innovative contributions on state, institutions and democracy in the field of political economy. Modern political economy has implied the interaction between politics and economics to understand political, electoral and public issues in different nations, and in this volume a group of leading political economists and political scientists from Europe, America and Asia provides theoretical advances, modelling and case studies on main topics in political economy. The analysis of the role and performance of politics and democracy in diverse nations implies the study of the organization of the state, lobbying, political participation, public policies, electoral politics, public administration and the provision of public services. This book provides advances in the research frontier of these topics and combines historical evidence, institutional analysis, mathematical models and empirical analysis in an interdisciplinary approach. Political and social scientists, economists and those interested in the performance of states, democracy and elections can find new research results in this volume.--

Understanding the governance of nations is a key challenge in contemporaneous political economy. This book provides new advances and the latest research in the field of political economy, dealing with the study of institutions, governance, democracy and elections. The volume focuses on issues such as the role of institutions and political governance in society, the working of democracy and the electoral performance in several case studies. The chapters involve cutting edge research on many different countries, including the USA, Great Britain, Germany, Spain, and the Third World. The authors of the chapters are leading scholars in political economy from America, Europe and Asia

Understanding the governance of nations is a key challenge in contemporaneous political economy. This book provides new advances and the latest research in the field of political economy, dealing with the study of institutions, governance, democracy and elections. The volume focuses on issues such as the role of institutions and political governance in society, the working of democracy and the electoral performance in several case studies. The chapters involve cutting edge research on many different countries, including the USA, Great Britain, Germany, Spain, and the Third World. The authors of the chapters are leading scholars in political economy from America, Europe and Asia.

This book presents research in political economy, dealing with the integration of economics and politics and the way institutions affect social decisions. It provides new techniques for analyzing elections, involving game theory and empirical methods.

AbstractThis article compares a variety of theoretical approaches to conceptualizing institutional change. Our goal is neither to discover the 'best' theory, nor to attempt to build a new one. Rather, we wish to compare how the theories we consider agree or differ with respect to the causes, process, and outcomes of institutional change. Some of the theories we discuss emphasize the deliberate creation of institutions through the political process, while others emphasize the spontaneous emergence of institutions through evolutionary processes. Still others combine elements of evolution and design. We differentiate a variety of approaches to conceptualizing the interaction between formal and informal rules. We discuss recent theories based on the 'Equilibrium View' of institutions, and theories emphasizing the role of habit, learning, and bounded rationality. We also consider theoretical explanations for institutional inertia and path-dependence.

Political trust has been considered a necessary condition for good democratic and economic performance over time. The grave economic crisis that started in 2008, which is known as the Great Recession, has deteriorated the level of political trust in several countries. Some authors have shown that those countries with an increasing level of unemployment experienced a sharp decline in political trust. In particular, the political distrust in Spain has suffered a high increase since the Great Recession. This paper tests the procyclicality of political trust in Spain through the analysis and modeling of the relationship between political trust and business cycle in Spain over the period 1996-2015. The cross-correlation analysis, the Granger causality test, and the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach coherently conclude the procyclicality of political trust in Spain. The unemployment rate shows a negative and statistically significant influence on political trust four quarters later.